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Abstract
This paper studies the identication of the costs of simultaneous search in portfolio problems
(Chade and Smith, 2006). We show that market shares data from a single market do not
provide sucient information to identify the search cost distribution in any interval, even if
utility distributions are known to the econometrician. We then show that by pooling data
from markets where the alternatives that similar decision makers confront vary, the search cost
distribution and the utility parameters of the logit demand model can be identied.
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The estimation of the costs consumers incur in markets when they search for satisfactory products
constitutes a new and important area of empirical research.1 The econometrician typically observes
the market shares and the characteristics of the dierent alternatives, but not necessarily the subset
of products searched by individual consumers. In markets where the costs of search are signicant,
variation in the market shares of the distinct alternatives is not just due to variation in their
characteristics but also due to variation in the subsets of products dierent decision-makers choose
to search. Therefore, the question is whether the costs of search can be identied with this type of
data.
This paper studies the nonparametric identication of the costs of simultaneous search in port-
folio problems (Chade and Smith, 2005, 2006). The class of portfolio problems we study embeds
a number of important decision problems in economics. In these problems a decision-maker must
simultaneously choose among a set of ranked stochastic options; each choice is costly and only the
best realized option is nally exercised. This problem arises for example when students apply for
colleges (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Kelso and Crawford, 1982; Roth and Sotomayor, 1989), when
consumers search for dierentiated products (Stigler, 1961; Wolinsky, 1986; Anderson and Renault,
1999), or when workers search for employment (Burdett et al., 2001; Albrecht et al., 2006; Kircher,
2009).
In all these papers, an important issue is the study of the extent to which the costs of search drive
a wedge between the market outcome and the social optimum and how it can be corrected. The
analysis of counterfactuals requires knowledge of the density of search costs. Therefore, assessments
of public policy measures aimed at aligning the market and the social outcomes (minimum wage
policy, information disclosure policy, merger policy, etc.), or estimating the social value of new
alternatives requires the development of methods to identify and estimate the costs of simultaneous
search. In this paper we study whether the restrictions imposed by economic theory allow for the
identication of search costs non-parametrically.
We consider markets where the costs of search vary across the decision-makers. In this type
of markets, we study whether the econometrician can identify the search cost distribution non-
parametrically using market shares data and knowing the utility distributions a large number of
options provide to the decision-makers. We rst show that such data from a single market do
1See e.g., Mehta, Rajiv, and Srinivasan (2003), Horta csu and Syverson (2004), Hong and Shum (2006), Kim,
Bronnenberg and Albuquerque (2009), Honka (2010), Koulayev (2010), Moraga-Gonz alez, S andor, and Wildenbeest
(2010) and Seiler (2010).
2not provide sucient information to identify the costs of simultaneous search in any reasonable
interval. The problem originates from the fact that the sequence of critical search costs that can
be identied from the data is convergent, so the set of search cost values the econometrician can
identify is not dense in the support of the search cost distribution.
The paper then proceeds by studying whether the use of aggregate data from multiple markets
suces to identify the search cost distribution. We propose to pool data from markets that dier
in the alternatives similar decision-makers confront. We show that these data allow for the joint
identication of the search cost distribution and the utility parameters in the logit demand model.
The reason why this type of data helps is that it generates a distinctive set of search cost values
in every market for which the econometrician can retrieve the density of search costs. By pooling
market share data from many markets one forces the search cost distribution to be uniquely de-
termined for a much larger set of points. Gathering the appropriate data is relatively easy for the
econometrician. For example, in the college problem, one can take data from dierent towns, with
typically distinct numbers of colleges, dierent application success rates, etc. In the case of con-
sumer search for dierentiated products, one can pool data from markets where dierent product
qualities are available.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We start by describing the class of simul-
taneous search problems we study in Section 2. The identication results use the market share
equations and these are derived in Section 3. Two leading examples studied in detail by Chade
and Smith (2005, 2006) are discussed in Section 4. Our identication results are given in Section
5. Section 6 concludes. The longer proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The model
We study the identication of the costs of search in a general class of simultaneous search problems.
In this class of problems, a decision-maker must make a simultaneous choice among (ranked)
stochastic options; each choice is costly and only the best realized alternative is nally consumed.
Chade and Smith (2005, 2006) have recently studied these problems and we build on their model.2
2Chade and Smith (2005, 2006) study the solution to the simultaneous search problem. They prove that a greedy
algorithm nds the solution in two sub-classes of problems: problems with downward recursive (DR) payo functions,
and non-DR problems with prize distributions ordered by a second-order stochastic dominance (SOSD) condition.
We instead focus on the identication of the costs of simultaneous search based on market data. Our identication
results are for more general payo structures which need not satisfy DR or SOSD. We nevertheless discuss the DR
and SOSD cases in separate subsections.
3We assume that in a market there is a continuum of heterogeneous decision-makers who can
choose to consume prizes/options from a set N containing N options. Each option i gives a payo
ui, where ui is a random variable with probability distribution 	i with support i  [ui;ui]  <;
i = 1;2;:::;N: We assume that the random variables u1;u2;:::;uN are independent. Let the interval
[0;u] contain the union of all the options' supports [ui;ui], i = 1;2;:::;N: The distribution 	i may
be discrete or continuous and the support i may include zero so that some options may fail to
give a positive payo with strictly positive probability. Let us denote by NF the set of options that
can fail with strictly positive probability (N = N F [ N F):
Assumption FD (free disposal). The set of alternatives N does not contain strictly domi-
nated options.
The role of this assumption is to exclude options for which market shares are equal to zero.
Suppose there exists an option ` whose payo is always higher than that of some other option k,
that is, uk  u`: Suppose also that option ` is a \sure" option in the sense that it always yields
a positive payo. In that case, ` strictly dominates k and k can be discarded from the set of
alternatives N. An implication of Assumption FD is that when all options can fail with strictly
positive probability, then there does not exist any option that can be ex-ante discarded. Moreover,
under Assumption FD, \i2NFi must be a non-empty interval.
Each decision-maker is characterized by her cost of searching an option. Let c be the cost of
search of a decision-maker. If the decision-maker searches the subset of options S; her total cost
is cjSj; where jSj denotes the cardinality of the subset S: Assume c is drawn independently from
a common atomless distribution H(c) with support 
 = [0;c]; let h(c) denote the corresponding
density. It will be convenient to assume c is suciently large, which ensures that there always exist
decision-makers who do not search at all.3
Every decision-maker ultimately consumes one single option (like in discrete choice models).
For a given set of options S N, let f(S) denote the expected (gross-of-cost) payo:










Note that f is a non-decreasing and bounded function. We adopt the normalization f(?) = 0: The
problem of a decision-maker with cost of searching options equal to c is to choose a (sub-)set of
options S  N to maximize her expected payo:
max
SN
ff(S)   cjSjg: (2)
3This assumption can easily be relaxed (see Section 4) and only requires some additional notation.
43 Market shares
The problem of identication consists of studying whether the information provided by the market
data and the market share equations is sucient to determine the primitives of the model. We
study next the derivation of the market share equations.
A solution to the problem in (2) for decision-maker with search cost c is a set of options S(c).
Given this decision-maker chooses to search the set S(c); she will consume the best of the options
in S(c): From the perspective of the entire market, when we vary c the optimal choice set changes.
Therefore, to compute the market share of an option j, we need to consider all the possible choice
sets that contain a given option j: Let Sj denote the set of choice sets that include option j:
Then, aggregating the individual decision-maker choices gives the market-shares of the dierent








where I(c chooses S) is the indicator that decision-maker c chooses the set of options S and PjjS
is the probability option j turns out to be the best option in the set S:
We next elaborate on these market shares. The solution to problem (2) can be understood
as follows. Let 1 = argmaxff (fig) : i 2 Ng be the best singleton option, that is, the single
alternative that yields the highest payo to the decision-maker among all possible single options.
Likewise, let 2 = argmaxff (fi;jg) : i;j 2 Ng be the best pair of alternatives, that is, the pair
of options that yields the highest payo to the decision-maker among all possible pairs. More
generally, let k = argmaxff (fi1;i2;:::;ikg) : i1;i2;:::;ik 2 Ng be the k-option tuple that gives
the highest payo to the decision-maker. Let 0 = ?:
Given the above denition of k, the optimal choice set for a decision-maker with search cost
c; S(c); is then equal to k(c) where4
k(c) = arg max
k2f0;1;:::;Ng
ff(k)   ckg: (4)
Since we have a continuum of decision-makers, we now argue this solution denes a partition of the
set of decision-makers into fractions k  0 of them choosing to search k options, with
PN
k=0 k = 1:
4When N is large, nding k
(c) is challenging from a computational point of view because there are 2
N choice sets
to be evaluated. Chade and Smith (2005, 2006) provide an algorithm, namely the Marginal Improvement Algorithm
(MIA), that identies the optimal solution for two classes of problems. The rst class is one where prizes are binary
(i = f0;uig) and the payo function f satises downward recursivity (DR). The second class is one where the prize
distributions 	i are ordered by a second-order stochastic dominance (SOSD) condition (see Section 4).





dH(c); k = 0;1;2;:::;N
which can be rewritten as
















Notice that the indicator I(ck > ck) can take value zero, which signies that no decision-maker will
choose to search k options (or the set of options k).
Our identication results build on the market share equations to retrieve the search cost distri-
bution at the set of points generated by the partition (5). We shall refer to these points as cuto
points, because they separate the search cost values that correspond to the dierent numbers of
searches. These cuto points, which are dened below in (8), follow from the critical search cost
values given in (6)-(7). We now state a property of the critical search cost values in (6)-(7) that is
useful to determine the cuto points in (8).
Proposition 1 If (i) ck  ck, (ii) ck+j  ck+j for j = 1;2;:::;h   1, and (iii) ck+h  ck+h for
some k  0; h  1; k + h < N, then




The proof of this result is in the Appendix. Building on this Proposition and on the critical
search cost values (6) and (7), we can dene the search cost cutos that separate the decision-makers






ck = ck+1 if ck  ck
ck 1 otherwise
for k  1: (8)
Under the conditions of Proposition 1, at the cuto point ck decision-makers are indierent between
searching the sets k and k+h. This implies that the sequence of cutos fckgN
k=0 satises an
important property.
6Proposition 2 The sequence of cuto points fckgN
k=0 dened in (8) is weakly decreasing.
We now provide a couple of examples to illustrate the cutos (8) and the fractions of consumers
(5). The purpose of the examples is twofold. First, the examples show that the cuto sequences
are indeed decreasing. Second, and more importantly, the examples serve the purpose of showing
that all numbers of options will not necessarily be searched by some decision-makers. In fact, in the
second example no decision maker nds it optimal to search 2 options. This is important because
such cases pose some threats for identication (cf. Proposition 4,ii).
Example 1. Consider a market where there are 3 options in total. For notational simplicity
let f`  f(`); ` = 1;2;3: Let f1 = 13;f2 = 18 and f3 = 20: A decision-maker with search cost
c above c0  maxff1;f2=2;f3=3g = 13 will clearly choose to search the empty set. This is the
fraction of consumers denoted 0 in Figure 1. Since c1  maxff2   f1;(f3   f1)=2g = f2   f1;
decision-makers with search cost c 2 (c1;c1) = (c1;c0) = (f2   f1;f1) clearly prefer to search just
one option. This is the fraction of consumers denoted 1 in the graph. Note that c2  f3   f2:
Therefore, decision-makers with search cost c 2 (c2;c2) = (c2;c1) = (f3 f2;f2 f1) nd it optimal
to search 2 options. This is the fraction of consumers 2 in the graph. Finally, decision-makers
with search cost c 2 (c3;c3) = (c3;c2) = (0;f3   f2) search the three options. This fraction of
consumers is denoted 3 in the Figure.
Figure 1: Search decisions in Example 1
7Example 2. This example is exactly identical to the one above except in that we now modify
the value of f2, which we lower from 18 to 15. This change is sucient to render the inequality
c2  f2  f1 < c2  f3  f2: As it can be seen, in this case the fraction of decision-makers who nd
it optimal to search two options is equal to zero.
Figure 2: Search decisions in Example 2
We are now ready to compute the market shares of the dierent alternatives. The system of
market shares in (3) can be rewritten as:







Pr[ui1;ui2;:::;uij = 0]I(i1;i2;:::;ij 2 j)













I (i;i1;i2;:::;ij 1 2 j) (9)
4 Special cases
We now present two important cases for which a solution to problem (2) can be found by applying
the MIA algorithm of Chade and Smith (2006). These two cases are special in that the payo
8function f has diminishing returns. As a result, in these two examples all numbers of options will
be searched with strictly positive probability, i.e. i > 0 for all i. As shown above, this is not true
in general.
4.1 Binary prizes (The college problem)
In the college problem5 a decision-maker must choose a portfolio of colleges S  N to which to
apply for admission. The distributions 	i have two-point supports: i = f0;uig: An option i
yields a ex-post payo ui with probability i 2 (0;1]; otherwise zero. The number i is then the
admission chance at college i: Moreover, college 1 is ex-post the best, college 2 is ex-post the second
best, etc.: u1 > u2 > ::: > uN: Applying for admission at S  N colleges costs the student cjSj.







(1   (j)) (10)
where (i) denotes the i-th best ranked college in the set S and therefore
i 1 Q
j=1
(1   (j)) is the
probability with which a decision-maker gets rejected by the top-ranked i   1 schools in S. Chade
and Smith (2006) point out that the payo function in (10) is downward recursive (DR). That is,
for any two sets U;L in N with U w L (i.e. where the worst option in U beats the best in L) we
have f(U + L) = f(U) + (U)f(L) where (U) 
Q
j2U
(1   j) is the chance that all the options in
the set U fail.
Chade and Smith (2006) provide an algorithm to nd S(c). The Marginal Improvement Al-
gorithm (MIA) identies the solution to this problem via an inductive procedure. In essence, the
MIA algorithm works as follows.
Step 1. Add the best single option 1 = argmaxfiui : i 2 Ng to the optimal choice set if
f(f1g)  c; otherwise choose the empty set and stop.
Step 2. Add option 2 = argmaxff(f1;ig) : i 2 Nf1gg to the optimal choice set if
f(f1;2g)   f(f1g)  c; otherwise stop.
...
Step k. Add option k = argmaxff(f1;2;:::;k 1;ig) : i 2 Nf1;2;:::;k 1gg to the
optimal choice set if f(f1;2;:::;kg)   f(f1;2;:::;k 1g)  c; otherwise stop (for all k =
3;4;::;N):
5The college problem is similar to the directed search problem in labor economics studied by Burdett, Shi and
Wright (2001), Albrecht et al. (2006) and Kircher (2009).
9For our purposes, we are interested in the market outcome this problem generates. Recall
that i denotes the probability that a randomly selected decision-maker chooses the set of options
f1;2;:::;ig; i = 1;2;::;N; and 0 is the probability of choosing the empty set. Since c is
distributed according to H; these probabilities can readily be computed:
0 = 1   H(c0) and
k = H(ck 1)   H(ck); k = 1;2;:::;N; (11)
where
c0 = f(f1g);
ck = f(f1;2;:::;k+1g)   f(f1;2;:::;kg); k = 1;2;:::;N   1 (12)
cN = 0:
The number ck is the corresponding cuto value of the search cost distribution that makes a decision-
maker indierent between choosing the best k-option-tuple and the best k + 1-option-tuple. We
note that the sequence of cuto values fcigN
i=0 is decreasing because f exhibits diminishing returns
(see Lemma 5 in Chade and Smith, 2006); therefore the probabilities i are well-dened and are
all strictly positive.
The market shares of the dierent options can be written as follows:













j; k = 1;2;:::;N: (13)
where ` is the probability with which the application of a decision-maker succeeds at college `:
4.2 Search for dierentiated products
Consider the following model of search for dierentiated products, which generalizes Stigler (1961)
and Burdett and Judd (1983) to the case of non-identical and non-sure prizes (Chade and Smith,
2005). There are N rms oering dierentiated products to a continuum of consumers. A consumer
must visit a set S of shops to learn the utility she derives from the dierent products available at
the shops in S. Once the utility is learnt, the consumer picks the single product that gives her the
highest utility. Assume that the product of a shop i gives a payo ui with probability i 2 (0;1];
10where ui is a random variable with probability distribution 	i and support [ui;ui];i = 1;2;:::;N:
The scalar i can be interpreted here as the probability with which a shop carries the product, or
has it in stock. Assume that the random variables u1;u2;:::;uN are independent. Let the interval
[0;u] contain the union of all the products' supports [ui;ui], i = 1;2;:::;N: Dene i = Iiui; where
Ii is a Bernoulli random variable that takes value 1 with probability i: The distribution of i is
Gi = (1   i) + i	i and its support is i  f0g [ [ui;ui] when i < 1, otherwise i  [ui;ui]:
Assumption SOSD. The distributions Gi can be ranked according to the quasi-second order




x Gi+1(u)du; i = 1;2;:::;N   1; for all
x 2 [0;u] with strict inequality at x = 0:
Given Assumption SOSD, ex-ante the best product is product 1, the second best product is











Chade and Smith (2005) note that the payo structure in (14) is not DR.
For our purpose, it is useful to prove that f has the following properties.
Proposition 3 Under Assumption SOSD,6:
(i) f(f1;2;:::;ig)  f(f1;2;:::;i   1;`g) for all `  i:
(ii) f(f1;2;:::;ig)   f(f1;2;:::;i   1g)  f(f1;2;:::;i + 1g)   f(f1;2;:::;ig); i = 2;:::;N:























Gj(u)(G`(u)   Gi(u))du  0;








(u)du  0: (15)
Note that  is monotonically increasing in u; is absolutely continuous on (0;u], with (0) = 0 and
(u) = 1: Moreover, by the SOSD assumption,
R u
x 






6In fact, we do not need the strict inequality condition at x = 0:
7We note that 
(u) may cross the horizontal axis several times.





















so the result follows.



























































Gj(u)(1   2Gi(u) + Gi(u)Gi+1(u))
1
Adu  0:



















For this, it suces that Z u
0
(u)(u)du  0; (16)
where (u) =
Qi
j=1 Gj(u) and (u) = Gi+1(u)   Gi(u): But this follows from the proof of (i).
We can use this proposition to describe the market outcome this problem generates. The
solution to the problem of a consumer with search cost c is a set of options f1;2;:::;i(c)g. From
Part (i) in the Proposition, we derive the following algorithm to encounter the optimal solution.8
Step 1. Add option 1 to the optimal choice set if f(f1g)  c; otherwise choose the empty set
and stop.
Step 2. Add option 2 to the optimal choice set if f(f1;2g)   f(f1g)  c; otherwise stop.
...
Step i. Add option i to the optimal choice set if f(f1;2;:::;ig) f(f1;2;:::;i 1g)  c; otherwise
stop (for all i = 3;4;::;N):
Since c is distributed according to H; the probability i that a randomly selected decision-maker
chooses to sample the set of options f1;2;:::;ig; i = 1;2;::;N; can readily be computed:
0 = 1   H(c0) and (17)
i = H(ci 1)   H(ci); i = 1;2;:::;N;
8This algorithm succeeds in O(N) steps.
12where
c0 = f(f1g);
ci = f(f1;2;:::;i + 1g)   f(f1;2;:::;ig); i = 1;2;:::;N   1 (18)
cN = 0:
The number ci in this case is the cuto value of the search cost distribution that makes a decision-
maker indierent between choosing i and i + 1 options. By Proposition 3, the sequence of cuto
values fcigN
i=0 is decreasing and therefore the probabilities i are all strictly positive.
Let qi denote the market share of option i: Computing the market share of an option i involves
summing over all 's the probability option i turns out to be the most attractive. In general this
market share can be written as follows:
q0 = 0;
q1 = 1 + 2 Pr(1 > 2) + ::: + N Pr(1 > maxf2;3:::;Ng);
q2 = 2 Pr(2 > 1) + ::: + N Pr(2 > maxf1;3:::;Ng); (19)
:::
qN = N Pr(N > maxf1;2;:::;N 1g):
5 Identication of the costs of search
The econometrics problem consists of retrieving the costs of simultaneous search, i.e., the dis-
tribution function H; from the market-share equations given in (9). A crucial requirement for
consistent estimation is that the search cost distribution is identied. In what follows, we study
whether such identication is possible and the necessary data requirements. We start with the case
where the econometrician has information about the preferences of the decision-makers. The joint
identication of preferences and search costs is postponed to section 5.2.
5.1 Identication with known preferences
In this section we treat the case of identication based on data from a single market.
Assumption DTA1. In a given market, the econometrician observes:
1. The distributions f	ig
N
i=1 over the set of prizes fig
N
i=1 the options can deliver.
2. The aggregate market shares of the options, denoted fqigN
i=0; where q0 is the market share
of the \outside" option.
13In the light of the special cases discussed in Section 4, Assumption DTA1 requires observing
the numbers of students accepted at the dierent colleges or observing the market shares of the
various products in a single market. Assumption 3.1 implies that the researcher knows the utility
distributions each option can yield. Admittedly, this is a signicant amount of information and
therefore this assumption represents a case quite favorable for identication of the search cost
distribution. Even in this favorable situation, we shall point to some identication challenges
(which of course would remain if the utility distributions were not known to the econometrician).
Later in Section 5.2 we discuss the joint identication of search costs and utility distributions.
The econometrician may be able to obtain additional data on the number of searches. Consider
then:
Assumption DTA2. The econometrician observes the data in Assumption DTA1 and in
addition the distribution of the number of searches in the market.
Our rst result studies if the data described above allow for the identication of the search cost
distribution at the cuto values dened in (8).
Proposition 4 (i) Under Assumption DTA1, in the binary-prize model, and in the search-for-
dierentiated-products model with SOSD, the search cost cuto values fcigN
i=0 and the corresponding
values of the CDF of search cost fH(ci)gN
i=0 are identied.
(ii) Under Assumption DTA1, in the general search model, the search cost cuto values fcigN
i=0
and the corresponding values of the CDF of search cost fH(ci)gN
i=0 need not be identied. However,
under Assumption DTA2, they are identied.
Proof. (i) In the binary prize model, fkgN
k=1 can be computed by the MIA algorithm. The
interesting case is when the probability the application of a decision-maker succeeds at a college
k < 1; for all k < N:9 The cuto values can be computed from the set of equalities (12). Market
shares satisfy the system of equations in (13). Note that this system of equations is triangular
and it has strictly positive diagonal elements (k-th diagonal element is k
k 1 Q
`=1
(1   `) > 0):
Therefore the system can be solved for fkgN
k=0: Once the fractions of students who apply to k
colleges is obtained, one can iteratively compute the corresponding values of the CDF of the costs
of simultaneous search at the cutos:
H(ci) = 1  
Xk
i=0 i where k = 0;1;:::;N:
9Otherwise, if k = 1 for some k < N then from (13) it follows qN = 0, so Assumption FD is violated.
14In the model of search for dierentiated products, the SOSD assumption makes the argu-
ments similar. From the equalities (18) one can compute the cuto values fcN
k gk=1: Using the
market shares in the system of equations (19) we can compute fkgN
k=0: Again this system is tri-
angular with k-th diagonal element equal to Pr(k > maxf1;2;:::;k 1g) > 0: Too see this,
denote by L  f1;2;:::;k   1g the subset of options that fail with strictly positive probabil-
ity. Let (L) be the probability that all options in L fail; by convention (?) = 1. Then
Pr(k > maxf0;1;2;:::;k 1g)  (L)Pr(k > max

0;maxfi : i 2 Lg
	
): If option k succeeds
with probability 1, then by Assumption SOSD, Pr(k > maxfi : i 2 Lg) > 0: If option k fails
with strictly positive probability, by Assumption FD on free disposal of strictly dominated options,
it must be the case that the upper bound of the support of option k; uk > maxfui : i 2 Lg: As
a result, Pr(k > maxfi : i 2 Lg) > 0: Once the fractions of consumers sampling k options are
known, one can iteratively compute the corresponding values of the CDF of search costs as before.
(ii) In the general model, the system of market shares might not be invertible and so we may
be unable to solve for fkgN
k=0: This precludes identication of the search cost distribution at the
cutos under Assumption DTA1. To illustrate the problem, let us go back to the case described
above in Example 1 where there are three options in total and f1 = 13;f2 = 18 and f3 = 20; where
f`  f(`); ` = 1;2;3: Assume also that 1 = f1g; and 2 = f2;3g: Finally, assume that 	i can

















Pr[u1 > 0] 0 Pr[u1 > maxf0;u2;u3g]
0 Pr[u2 > maxf0;u3g] Pr[u2 > maxf0;u1;u3g]
















Notice that the matrix of coecients in this system need not be triangular. In fact, the system is
not invertible provided that
Pr[u2 > maxf0;u3g]Pr[u3 > maxf0;u1;u2g] = Pr[u2 > maxf0;u1;u3g]Pr[u3 > maxf0;u2g]:
Under the data assumption DTA2, the econometrician observes fkgN
k=0 and then the search cost
distribution at the cutos is identied.
Proposition 4 gives conditions under which one can identify the sequence of points fci;H(ci)gN
i=0
of the search cost distribution. Clearly, a limited number of options will not suce to identify a
density. The question that arises is whether taking a market with a suciently large number of
options can allow for the identication of the search cost distribution with enough precision. The
next result argues that it is impossible even if the number of options goes to innity.
15Proposition 5 Under Assumptions DTA1 or DTA2, the search cost distribution is not identied in
any interval of interest in either of the models (the binary-prize model, the search-for-dierentiated-
products model with SOSD and the general model), even if N ! 1.
Proof. From Proposition 2, the sequence of cutos is weakly decreasing and therefore con-
vergent. As a result, the set of points outside an arbitrarily small neighborhood around the limit
point will necessarily be nite. This implies that the search cost distribution is not identied in
any interval of interest.
Proposition 5 shows that using the type of aggregate data described in Assumption DTA1 and
DTA2 only allows for identication of the costs of simultaneous search around the limit point of
the sequence of cutos. This constitutes an important problem because any reasonable study of
the eects of public policy measures aimed at improving the market outcome in any of the settings
described above (for instance, introducing new college options, increasing school places, challenging
a merger between options, etc.) would require the identication of search costs at all quantiles. We
now proceed to study the identication of the search cost distribution in richer settings.
5.2 Joint identication of preferences and search costs
In the previous section we have pointed out that, even if the econometrician knows the preferences
of decision-makers, the search cost distribution cannot be identied using data from a single market.
In this section we argue that by pooling data from several markets it is possible to identify the
search cost distribution non-parametrically.10 Such an identication result would not be very useful
from a practical point of view if preferences of decision-makers were not identiable. Therefore in
this Section we focus on the joint identication of preferences and search costs.
We study this question in the widely used random utility framework that leads to logit demands.
Therefore, we consider that the payo of an option i in a certain market is given by
ui = xi + "i; (20)
where the vector xi represents the (observable) characteristics of option i, the vector  represents
the importance of each characteristic in the payo of a decision-maker and "i is a random variable
that represents the match between a decision maker and the option i: We assume "i to be type-I
extreme value distributed.
10This strategy is related to the literature on nonparametric identication of the distribution of random coecients
in discrete choice models. For example, the identication result in Bajari et al. (2010), although based on a dierent
formal argument, also requires pooling market share data from several markets.
16We assume that the purpose of searching is to discover the match values "i of the alternatives
chosen to be searched. Meanwhile, the vectors of characteristics xi of the various options are
assumed to be known at the moment the decision-maker chooses her set of alternatives S to be
searched. Once the options in the choice set S are evaluated and the decision-maker learns the
match values, the decision-maker picks one of the options to consume, or else takes the outside
option, whose utility is normalized to zero.

















 is the Euler constant. Without loss of generality, assume that the best product ex-ante
has index 1, the second best has index 2, etc., that is, x1  x2 :::  xN. Then it is easy
to see that the payo function f in (21) satises the properties from Proposition 3, that is, (i)
f(f1;2;:::;ig)  f(f1;2;:::;i   1;`g) for all `  i and (ii) f(f1;2;:::;ig)   f(f1;2;:::;i   1g) 
f(f1;2;:::;i+1g) f(f1;2;:::;ig); i = 2;:::;N. Therefore, using (18), the cuto points are given by
c0 = f (f1g)   f (?) = 
 + x1;















cN = 0: (22)
Note that from (17) and (19) we obtain that H (
 + x1) = 1   q0.
Suppose that the econometrician observes the market shares and the characteristics of the
options in M dierent markets. Assume that the vector of characteristics of the best product in
market m; denoted xm
1 ; is a random draw from a distribution with continuum support such that
the random variables 
 + xm
1 0 cover the support of H, where 0 is the true parameter vector.
Then for given , we can identify the search cost distribution H for which H (
 + xm
1 ) = 1 qm
0 ,
for all m, on some support that may depend on . In order to show that the we can identify the
true 0, suppose by contradiction that for another parameter, say 1, we have the same search cost
distribution, that is, H0 = H1. This implies that 
 + xm
1 0 = H 1
0 (1   qm
0 ) = H 1

















. If M is greater
than or equal to the dimension of the vector of characteristics, this can only happen if X1 does not
have full rank, which is a zero-probability event. As a result, we conclude that 0 is identied and
H0 identies the true search cost distribution. To summarize:
17Proposition 6 Consider the simultaneous search model with logit demand described above. As-
sume the econometrician has market shares data from a suciently large number of markets M.
Moreover, assume that product characteristics are random draws from a distribution with continuum
support such that the random variables 
 + xm
1 0 cover the support of the search cost distribution
H; where xm
1 is the vector of characteristics of the best product in market m; and 0 is the true
parameter vector. Then, the preference parameter vector 0 and the search cost distribution H are
jointly identied.
The reason why pooling data from multiple markets helps identify the search cost distribution
is that variation in xi across markets generates variation in the set of search cost cutos (22) for
which the econometrician can retrieve the density of search costs. Therefore, by pooling market
share data from many markets, one forces the search cost distribution to be uniquely determined
for a much larger set of points.
6 Concluding remarks
The estimation of consumer search costs in markets constitutes a new and important area of
empirical research. In this paper we have asked whether the costs of simultaneous search can
be non-parametrically identied using data on the market shares and the characteristics of the
dierent alternatives to be searched. We have shown that employing data from a single market
does not suce to identify the search cost distribution even if the utility distributions of the dierent
alternatives are known to the econometrician.
We have then shown that by pooling market share data from multiple markets with varying
alternatives and similar decision makers the search cost distribution and the utility parameters of
the logit demand model are identied. We have adopted the logit demand framework for technical
simplicity. However, our identication result relies on obtaining variation across markets that
causes variation in the search cost cutos that are identied from single markets. This strategy
should be successful with other demand structures.
Our study has focused on demand and search cost identication and therefore we have ignored
potential endogeneity of some of the characteristics of the alternatives, for example the price.
Moreover, we have assumed decision-makers are heterogeneous only in search costs. Identication
of models with additional heterogeneity (mixed logit) and price endogeneity is an interesting and
open avenue for further research.11
11In related work, we have studied the identication of search costs in a market with homogeneous products (cf.
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Proof of Proposition 1. For notational simplicity, denote f`  f(`) for any `. Before providing
the proof we state the following auxiliary result.





































































































for all ` < k;
Moraga-Gonz alez, S andor and Wildenbeest, 2010). The approach there is quite dierent because identication with
endogenous prices does not require the use of instruments, as opposed to the case of dierentiated products where it
does. Moreover, since with homogeneous products equilibrium is characterized by mixed strategies, information on
market shares is not necessary.





k + j   `














































for all ` > k + h;
which is equivalent to
f`   fk+j






















Based on (ii), (26), (27), we obtain the result. 
















k + h   `







for all ` < k;
m
(k   `)(fk+j   fk)  j (fk   f`) for all ` < k;
m
(k   `)(fk+j   fk) + j (fk+j   fk)  j (fk   f`) + j (fk+j   fk) for all ` < k;
m






k + j   `
for all ` < k;

















`   (k + h)
for all ` > k + h;






for all i with 1  i  h   1. (30)






for all ` < k;






for all ` < k;






for all i with 1  i  h   1:
This is, however, equivalent to (30), so by showing (30) we can establish both (28) and (29). That
is what we do in the remaining of this proof.
In proving (30) we proceed by induction with respect to i. First we prove (30) for i = 1, that
is,




If h = 1 then there is nothing to prove. Assume h  2. By (23) for j = 1 we have





























Indeed, (31) and (32) imply that fk+1   fk 
fk+`1 fk+1
`1 1 , which is equivalent to












`1 ` for any ` 2 [2;`1   1]. So fk+1   fk 
fk+`1 fk+`
`1 ` for any ` 2 [0;`1   1] and (33) follows.
By (23) for j = `1 and (33)


















Now, similar to (33), we argue that










Indeed, (35) and (36) imply that




which together with (33) implies fk+1   fk 
fk+`2 fk+`










` 2 [`1 + 1;`2   1]. These imply (37).
We can continue this procedure up to some step s so that we obtain
fk+1   fk 
fk+`j   fk+`j 1
`j   `j 1
for j = 1;:::;s; (39)
where `0 = 0. The sequence (`j)
s
j=1 is strictly increasing, so for some nite s we get `s = h. By
summing (39) for j = 1;:::;s we get the desired result.
The next step in the induction with respect to i is to assume that (30) holds for 1;2;:::;i   1,
that is,





























































and (30) follows by (40).






for all ` 2 [0;i   1]: (42)
























for all ` 2 [i + 1;h]: (44)













for all ` 2 [0;`1   1]: (45)
Indeed, (42) and (43) are equivalent to
(i   `)(fk+i   fk)  i(fk+i   fk+`) for all ` 2 [0;i   1] and
(`1   i)(fk+i   fk)  i(fk+`1   fk+i);













for all ` 2 [i + 1;`1   1];






for all ` 2 [i + 1;`1   1]: (47)
23Then (45) follows by (43), (46), (47).




































for all ` 2 [0;`2   1]: (50)
By (48) and (45)
(`2   `1)(fk+i   fk)  i(fk+`2   fk+`1);
(`1   `)(fk+i   fk)  i(fk+`1   fk+`) for all ` 2 [0;`1   1];






for all ` 2 [0;`1   1]: (51)




















for all ` 2 [`1 + 1;`2   1]:






for all ` 2 [`1 + 1;`2   1]:
This, (51) and (52) imply (50).






for j = 1;:::;s; (53)
where `0 = 0. The sequence (`j)
s
j=1 is strictly increasing, so for some nite s we get `s = h. By
summing (53) for j = 1;:::;s we get the desired result. 
24Proof of Proposition 2. We show that ck+1  ck. The interesting case is when ck+1  ck+1
because if ck+1 > ck+1 then ck+1 = ck. First consider the case when ck  ck. Then by (8)
and Proposition 1 (with h = 1) ck+1 = ck+1  ck+1 = ck = ck. Next consider the case when
ck > ck. Let ` < k be the largest i such that ci  ci. Assume, for the moment, that c1  c1:
Then `  1. Then Proposition 1 implies that ck+1 = c`, so ck+1 = ck+1  ck+1 = c` = c`, and
since ck > ck;ck 1 > ck 1;:::;c`+1 > c`+1, by (8) ck = ck 1 = ::: = c`; therefore, ck+1  ck. To
complete the argument, we prove that c1  c1; which follows from the following Lemma because
the inequality c1  c1 is equivalent to (f(`)   f(1))=(`   1)  f(1) for all ` > 1, which is
equivalent to f(`)=`  f(1) for all ` > 1.
Lemma 2 f(k)=k is decreasing in k for k  1.












Adu  0: (54)






	i(u) for all h 2 k+1:




















































This will follow from the fact that if a1;a2;:::;ak+1 2 [0;1] and Sk+1 = f1;2;:::;k + 1g then









This can be proved by induction by noting that









































ai   ak+1 +
k+1 Y
i=1



















































The proof of Proposition 2 is now complete. 
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